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(C) Will be performed within the United States, except Alaska.

(ii) The prohibition in paragraph (c)(i) of this section does not apply—

(A) To contracts for environmental restoration at an installation that is being closed or realigned where payments are made from a Base Realignment and Closure Account; or

(B) To contracts specifically approved in writing, setting forth the reasons therefor, in accordance with the following:

(1) The Secretaries of the military departments are authorized to approve such contracts that are for environmental work only, provided the environmental work is not classified as construction, as defined by 10 U.S.C. 2801.

(2) The Secretary of Defense or designee must approve such contracts that are not for environmental work only or are for environmental work classified as construction.

[62 FR 1058, Jan. 8, 1997; 62 FR 1817, Jan. 13, 1997; 62 FR 49305, Sept. 19, 1997]

Subpart 216.4—Incentive Contracts

216.402 Application of predetermined, formula-type incentives.

216.402-2 Technical performance incentives.

Contractor performance incentives should relate to specific performance areas of milestones, such as delivery or test schedules, quality controls, maintenance requirements, and reliability standards.

216.403 Fixed-price incentive contracts.

(b) *Application.*

(3) Individual line items may have separate incentive provisions; e.g., when dissimilar work calls for separate formulas.

216.403-2 Fixed-price incentive (successive targets) contracts.

(a) *Description.* (1)(iii) The formula does not apply for the life of the contract. It is used to fix the firm target profit for the contract. To provide an incentive consistent with the circumstances, the formula should reflect

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the relative risk involved in establishing an incentive arrangement where cost and pricing information were not sufficient to permit the negotiation of firm targets at the outset.

216.404 Fixed-price contracts with award fees.

Award-fee provisions may be used in fixed-price contracts as provided in 216.470

[63 FR 11529, Mar. 9, 1998]

216.405 Cost-reimbursement incentive contracts.

216.405-1 Cost-plus-incentive-fee contracts.

(b) *Application.*

(3) Give appropriate weight to basic acquisition objectives in negotiating the range of fee and the fee adjustment formula. For example—

(A) In an initial product development contract, it may be appropriate to provide for relatively small adjustments in fee tied to the cost incentive feature, but provide for significant adjustments if the contractor meets or surpasses performance targets.

(B) In subsequent development and test contracts, it may be appropriate to negotiate an incentive formula tied primarily to the contractor's success in controlling costs.

[56 FR 36340, July 31, 1991. Redesignated at 63 FR 11529, Mar. 9, 1998]

216.405-2 Cost-plus-award-fee contracts.

(a) *Description.* (i) Normally, award fee is not earned when the fee-determining official has determined that contractor performance has been submarginal or unsatisfactory.

(ii) The basis for all award fee determinations shall be documented in the contract file.

(b) *Application.* (1) The cost-plus-award-fee (CPAF) contract is also suitable for level of effort contracts where mission feasibility is established but measurement of achievement must be by subjective evaluation rather than objective measurement. See Table 16-1, Performance Evaluation Criteria, for sample performance evaluation criteria

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and Table 16-2, Contractor Performance Evaluation Report, for a sample evaluation report.

(2) The contracting activity may—

(A) Establish a board to—

(1) Evaluate the contractor's performance; and

(2) Determine the amount of the award or recommend an amount to the contracting officer.

(B) Afford the contractor an opportunity to present information on its own behalf.

(c) *Limitations.* The CPAF contract shall not be used—

(i) To avoid—

(A) Establishing CPFF contracts when the criteria for CPFF contracts apply, or

(B) Developing objective targets so a CPIF contract can be used.

(ii) For either engineering development or operational system development acquisitions which have specifications suitable for simultaneous research and development and production, except a CPAF contract may be used for individual engineering development or operational system development acquisitions ancillary to the development of a major weapon system or equipment, where—

(A) It is more advantageous; and

(B) The purpose of the acquisition is clearly to determine or solve specific problems associated with the major weapon system or equipment.

(2)(A) Do not apply the weighted guidelines method to CPAF contracts for either the base (fixed) fee or the award fee.

(B) The base fee shall not exceed three percent of the estimated cost of the contract exclusive of the fee.

[56 FR 36340, July 31, 1991. Redesignated at 63 FR 11529, Mar. 9, 1998]

216.470 Other applications of award fees.

The "award amount" portion of the fee may be used in other types of contracts under the following conditions—

(1) The Government wishes to motivate and reward a contractor for management performance in areas which cannot be measured objectively and where normal incentive provisions cannot be used. For example, logistics support, quality, timeliness, ingenuity, and cost effectiveness are areas under the control of management which may be susceptible only to subjective measurement and evaluation.

(2) The "base fee" (fixed amount portion) is not used.

(3) The chief of the contracting office approves the use of the "award amount."

(4) An award review board and procedures are established for conduct of the evaluation.

(5) The administrative costs of evaluation do not exceed the expected benefits.

TABLE 16-1—PERFORMANCE EVALUATION CRITERIA

		Submarginal	Marginal	Good	Very good	Excellent
A—Time of Delivery.	(A-1) Adherence to plan schedule.	Consistently late on 20% of plans.	Late on 10% plans w/o prior agreement.	Occasional plan late w/o justification.	Meets plan schedule.	Delivers all plans on schedule & meets prod. change requirements on schedule.
	(A-2) Action on Anticipated delays.	Does not expose changes or resolve them as soon as recognized.	Exposes changes but is dilatory in resolution on plans.	Anticipates changes, advise Shipyard but misses completion of design plans 10%.	Keeps Yard posted on delays, resolves independently on plans.	Anticipates in good time, advises Shipyard, resolves independently and meets production schedule.